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Alternatives to March-In Rights
David S. Bloch*
ABSTRACT
The Bayh-Dole Act is an inspired piece of legislation. But its
"march-in" provisions are too often a source of confusion and fear for
private-sector companies that want to do business with the US
government-despite he fact that the government has never exercised
its march-in rights. Are there alternatives to march-in rights that
would effectively serve the government's public policy needs while
eliminating this perceived threat to private intellectual property
rights? This Article describes march-in rights in theory and practice,
and then weighs several alternatives to traditional Bayh-Dole march-in
rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE BAYH-DOLE ACT AND GOVERNMENT
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY
The Bayh-Dole Act, the "most inspired piece of legislation to be
enacted in America over the past century,"' is a chapter of the Patent
Act that controls the ownership and disposition of patents created
with US government funds.2 It grants certain private contractors
patents in inventions created using US funds,3 but restricts how those
patents can be licensed4 and under what circumstances they can be
maintained in confidence.5 It also controls how the US government
can apply for patents6 and how government-owned patents can be
licensed to the private sector.7 Aspects of the Bayh-Dole Act have
been copied worldwide.
8
1. Innovation's Golden Goose, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 2002; see also John H.
Raubitschek & Norman J. Latker, Reasonable Pricing - A New Twist for March-In Rights
Under The Bayh-Dole Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 149, 150 (2005) ("The Act
has been enormously effective"); Abigail Amato Rives, Reorienting Bayh-Dole's March-In:
Looking to Purpose and Objectives in the Public's Interest, 5 AMERICAN U. INTELL. PROP. BRIEF
77, 86 (2014) ("The Bayh-Dole Act ... has been applauded for major contributions to the U.S.
economy and it is even credited with providing the foundation for the entire biotech industry.").
2. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-12 (2012).
3. See 35 U.S.C. § 202 (2012).
4. See 35 U.S.C. § 204 (2012).
5. See 35 U.S.C. § 205 (2012).
6. See 35 U.S.C. § 207 (2012).
7. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 208-09 (2012).
8. See Manisha Singh Nair, Indian Bayh-Dole on its Path, IPFrontline (Oct. 8, 2007),
http://ipfrontline.com/2007/10/indian-baye-dole-on-its-path/ [http://perma.cc/ZV29-8TA7]
(discussing India's efforts to emulate Bayh-Dole in the context of university research); J. Steven
Rutt & Stephen B. Maebius, Technology Transfer Under Japan's Bayh-Dole: Boom or Bust
Nanotechnology Opportunities?, NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS., Vol. 1, No. 3, Article 8 (2004)
(discussing the Japanese government's efforts to emulate Bayh-Dole for nanotechnology); John
Fraser and Ashley Stevens, Understanding the Importance of Bayh-Dole, Managing Intell. Prop.
(Dec. 2005/Jan. 2006) ("Countries around the world are expressing their agreement by adopting
laws similar to the Bayh-Dole Act. Germany, Korea and Taiwan are the most recent countries
allowing academic institutions, as opposed to individual professors, to own inventions resulting
from research in their labs. In Japan, the government is privatizing the entire university system
in part because they want Japanese universities to become economic catalysts, like their US
counterparts. The British and Canadian governments have established pools of funds to
accelerate the commercialization of university research.").
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March-in rights, which allow the government to forcibly license
government-funded, privately-owned patents to third parties, are the
most controversial feature of the Bayh-Dole Act.9 In light of industry
concerns over march-in rights, this Article analyzes whether there are
any viable alternatives to march-in rights that would meet the
government's objectives of ensuring effective commercialization. Part
II addresses the evolution of the Bayh-Dole Act and the policies
underlying it. Part III describes how march-in rights work in practice
and prior efforts to trigger government march-in. Part IV discusses
possible alternatives to march-in rights.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE BAYH-DOLE ACT
Prior to the 1980 enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act, under both
Republican and Democratic administrations, the US government
owned all patents to technology developed using government funds.1 °
This modus vivendi reflected a government contracting ecosystem in
which a small cadre of large, integrated, government-facing
contractors supplied the government's technological needs. By the
1970s, however, deep concerns about the government's inability to
disseminate the technologies it owned for the public benefit or to
acquire superior technologies to serve its own needs led to a
rethinking of how to encourage increased private sector participation
in the government marketplace. This reconsideration also led to new
ways of conveying government-developed technology to the private
sector and, ultimately, consumers." Along with the Stevenson-Wydler
Technology Innovation Act, which jump-started agency
technology-transfer efforts,12 the Bayh-Dole Act was the first-and
arguably most important-step in a process that has led to our current
regime: a regime in which contractors own most intellectual property
developed at public expense.
The Bayh-Dole Act itself applies narrowly to two classes of
patents: patents on inventions developed by government contractors in
the course of a funding agreement (so-called "subject inventions"
13)
and patents on inventions arising out of the work of federal
employees.14 The Bayh-Dole Act's rules concerning the disposition of
9. See 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2012).
10. See, e.g., Memorandum and Statement of Government Patent Policy, 28 Fed. Reg.
10943 (Oct. 12, 1963) (Pres. Kennedy); 36 Fed. Reg. 16877 (Aug. 26, 1971) (Pres. Nixon).
11. See generally JAMES G. MCEWEN, DAVID S. BLOCH, RICHARD M. GRAY, & JOHN T.
LUCAS, IP AND TECHNOLOGY IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 6-9 (LexisNexis 2014).
12. Pub. L. 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3701).
13. See 35 U.S.C. § 202 (2012).
14. See 35 U.S.C. § 209 (2012).
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rights in subject inventions are likewise rather narrow. For the most
part, they provide that a contractor can elect title to a subject
invention first conceived or reduced to practice under a government
contract, though in "exceptional circumstances," the government may
retain title instead.15
There are three important limitations to the Bayh-Dole Act:
1) it is limited to patents, 2) it only applies to funding agreements, and
3) it only applies to small businesses and nonprofit organizations. I
address each of these limitations in more depth below.
First, as noted, the Bayh-Dole Act is codified in Title 35 of the
US Code and only applies to patents. The Act says nothing about the
disposition of copyrights, trademarks, or trade secrets. Under the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), however, similar rules apply to
copyrights (in the form of computer software) and trade secrets (in the
form of technical data)16-rules buttressed by the fact that the
government cannot create copyrighted goods17 and is statutorily
barred from revealing contractor trade secrets.18 Trademarks remain
a special case, little understood by the government or the contracting
community.19
Second, the Bayh-Dole Act only applies to patentable
technology developed under "funding agreements"20-"contract[s],
grant[s], or cooperative agreement[s] ... funded in whole or in part by
the Federal Government"21-in the United States. Other forms of
government agreement may not trigger the Bayh-Dole Act at all,22 and
foreign contractors are not entitled to elect title to subject inventions.
23
Third, the Bayh-Dole Act only applies to small businesses and
nonprofit enterprises, including universities.24 By its terms and as a
question of its stated policy, the Bayh-Dole Act does not apply to large
commercial concerns because the original statute wanted to encourage
15. FAR 27.302(b)(2), (d).
16. FAR Subpart 27.4, Rights in Data and Copyrights, applies to all executive agencies
other than the Department of Defense. DFARS Subparts 227.71, Rights in Technical Data, and
227.72, Rights in Computer Software and Computer Software Documentation, apply to the
Department of Defense.
17. See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2012).
18. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2012).
19. See generally David S. Bloch & James G. McEwen, Like Toddlers in Big Surf" Can
the Government Control the Effects of Federal Trademark Liability?, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 209
(2003).
20. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c) (2012).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012).
22. See, e.g., David S. Bloch & James G. McEwen, "Other Transactions" With Uncle
Sam: A Solution to the High-Tech Government Contracting Crisis, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 195
(2002).
23. FAR 27.302(b)(2)(i) (2014).
24. 35 U.S.C. §§ 201(h)-(i), 202(c) (2012).
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"maximum participation of small business firms" and "collaboration
between commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations, including
universities,... nonprofit organizations and small business firms."25
However, in 1987, President Reagan's Executive Order 12591
extended the Bayh-Dole Act's rule allowing private contractors to own
government-funded patents to all organizations doing business with
the government.26 Similarly, the Bayh-Dole Act does not apply to the
Department of Energy (DOE) or the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), whose organic statutes require that they own
patents funded by certain of their efforts.27 In contrast to the Bayh-
Dole Act, the Atomic Energy Act states:
Any invention or discovery, useful in the production or utilization of special nuclear
material or atomic energy, made or conceived in the course of or under any contract,
subcontract, or arrangement entered into with or for the benefit of the [Atomic Energy]
Commission, regardless of whether the contract, subcontract, or arrangement involved
the expenditure of funds by the Commission, shall be vested in, and be the property of,
the Commission.
28
The DOE's founding statute likewise indicates that
"[w]henever any invention is made or conceived in the course of or
under any contract of the [Energy] Department, other than nuclear
energy research, development, and demonstration pursuant to the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 ... title to such invention shall vest in the
United States" unless the Secretary of Energy waives the
Department's rights.2
9
As to NASA, and again unlike the Bayh-Dole Act, the Space
Act states, "An invention shall be the exclusive property of the United
States if it is made in the performance of any work under any contract
of [NASA]. '"3° But NASA and DOE are permitted to waive their
default intellectual property rights in favor of a Bayh-Dole-like system
and almost always use these waiver rules to grant contractors rights
in subject inventions.
31
Thus, by the end of the 1980s, a stated purpose of government
procurement law was "to use the patent system to promote the
utilization of inventions arising in federally supported research or
25. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2012).
26. Exec. Order No. 12591 was implemented primarily by FAR part 27,52.227-11 and
52.227-13, along with (at the Department of Defense) DFARS 252.227-7038 in supplement X27
and X27.5227. It has since been codified at 35 U.S.C. § 210(c).
27. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2182, 5908 (2012); 51 U.S.C. § 20135 (2012); US Dep't of
Energy v. White, 210 U.S.P.Q. 425 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2182 (2012).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 5908(a) (2012).
30. 51 U.S.C. § 20135(b)(1) (2012).
31. See 10 C.F.R. 784 (2014).
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development.'3 2 This policy aim superseded other possible incentives
for acquiring intellectual property. Unlike in the private sector, the
government views patents not as economic assets or defensive
weapons in IP litigation, but rather as vehicles for technology
transfer.33 But technology transfer is not the only policy objective
enshrined in the Bayh-Dole Act. Rather, 35 U.S.C. § 200 identifies
several different government goals, which include:
"[P]romot[ing] the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or
development."
"[E]ncourag[ing] maximum participation of small business firms in federally supported
research and development efforts."
"[P]romot[ing] collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations,
including universities."
"[E]nsur[ing] that inventions made by nonprofit organizations and small business firms
are used in a manner to promote free competition and enterprise without unduly
encumbering future research and discovery."
"[P]romot[ing] the commercialization and public availability of inventions made in the
United States by United States industry and labor."
"[E]nsur[ing] that the Government obtain sufficient rights in federally supported
inventions to meet the needs of the Government and protect the public against the
non-use or unreasonable use of inventions."
3 4
As discussed below, march-in rights are one of the several ways
that the government seeks to satisfy these sometimes inconsistent
goals.
III. MARCH-IN RIGHTS
A. Definition of March-In Rights
March-in rights are the government's only real vehicle for
enforcing the limitations contained in the Bayh-Dole Act. The
government's march-in rights are set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 203, which
states that "the Federal agency under whose funding agreement the
subject invention was made shall have the right. . . to require the
contractor... to grant a nonexclusive, partly exclusive, or exclusive
license in any field of use to responsible applicant or applicants, upon
terms that are reasonable under the circumstances" in four specific
situations:
32. 37 C.F.R. § 404.2 (2014).
33. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2012) ("It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the
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1. "[Tlhe contractor.., has not taken, or is not expected to take within a reasonable
time, effective steps to achieve practical application of the subject invention in such
field of use."
2. March-in rights are "necessary to alleviate health or safety needs which are not
reasonably satisfied by the contractor."
3. "[T]o meet requirements for public use specified by Federal regulations" if "said
requirements are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor."
4. The contractor fails to honor its US manufacturing commitments as required by 35
U.S.C. § 204.
35
The government's march-in rights are intended to "protect the
public against nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions.' 36  Under
§ 203(b), march-in determinations are not subject to the
Administrative Procedures Act but rather are governed by
agency-specific rules.37 March-in determinations can be appealed
within sixty days of the determination in the US Court of Federal
Claims. The government can exercise march-in rights sua sponte or
may act in response to a third-party petition.38
The march-in mechanism thus lets the government force the
patentee to grant royalty-bearing sublicenses in the event that the
patentee is not commercializing a subject invention and public policy
concerns require another manufacturing source. In this sense,
march-in rights are similar to a "best efforts" clause in a commercial
contract (that is, a clause requiring a licensee to use its best efforts to
commercialize a patented invention). As Senator Birch Bayh
explained:
When Congress was debating our approach fear was expressed that some companies
might want to license university technologies to suppress them because they could
threaten existing products. Largely to address this fear, we included the march-in
provisions.
39
As a result, march-in rights were originally created to ensure
that patent owners would commercialize-rather than
suppress-subject inventions. Of course, march-in rights can be
justified by the proposition that the public, which arguably funded the
most critical parts of the inventive process-conception and
prototyping, should not have to pay twice for the technology embodied
in a subject invention.
35. 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2012).
36. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2012).
37. 35 U.S.C. § 203(b) (2012).
38. 37 C.F.R. § 401.6(b).
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B. Other Restrictions on Subject Inventions
Patents on subject inventions are subject to a series of
regulations and rules. In theory, a contractor must follow these rules
in order to elect title to an invention developed at government
expense. Some of these rules apply before the contractor is permitted
to take title to a subject invention, while others govern what the
contractor can (or must) do once it owns the resulting patent. Before
the contractor can elect title, it must notify the government that it has
developed a subject invention in a format provided by the
government.40 After the contractor has elected title, it must make
reasonable and good faith efforts to commercialize the subject
invention in the United States.41 For example, the contractor must
manufacture substantially in the United States and preferentially
issue licenses to subcontractors and manufacturers in the United
States.42 To ensure its compliance with these rules, the patentee must
list the government as a funder on the face of its patent43 and provide
periodic utilization reports on its efforts to comply with the Bayh-Dole
Act's policies.44 The government retains a royalty-free, nonexclusive,
fully paid-up government-purpose license, along with the right to
approve sublicenses to ensure that "the right to obtain by the
government" is expressly conveyed in any sublicense.
45
C. The Government's Refusal to Exercise March-In Rights
Though march-in rights have been a feature of the statutory
landscape since 1980, they have never been exercised. There have
been a total of five march-in petitions decided by a government
agency-all, as it happens, by the National Institutes of Health (NIH).
In each instance, the government has declined to march in and force
the licensee to grant additional licenses.
1. In re CellPro (1997)
In re CeliPro was the first formal march-in petition to reach the
federal courts.46 The US government's refusal to march in on a Johns





45. 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(a).
46. In re Petition of CellPro, Inc. (Nat'l Inst. of Health, 1997) (determination),
http://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy/cellpro-marchin.pdf
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Hopkins pharmaceutical patent sparked immediate controversy both
because it was the first time the concept of march-in was introduced to
a wider audience of activists and IP lawyers and because it seemed to
favor strong patents rights even at the expense of more rapid
commercialization.47  In the CelIPro decision, Johns Hopkins
University owned a government-funded patent on a particular stem
cell antibody. CellPro, Inc. obtained Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) approval for a drug product involving an antibody, and the
university sued CellPro for patent infringement.48  In response,
CellPro first asked the court for a compulsory license and then
petitioned the NIH to march in on the theory that Johns Hopkins had
failed to effectively commercialize the subject invention because it had
not yet obtained FDA approval to market the patented antibody. The
NIH refused to exercise its march-in rights, reasoning that John
Hopkins University (which was seeking its own FDA approval, albeit
at a slower pace) was taking reasonable efforts to commercialize its
patent and that CellPro had failed to even ask for a license from the
university.49 By favoring the patentee over a proposed entrant that
promised to reach the market faster, CellPro set the template for later
march-in petitions and also triggered the first stirrings of proposals to
reform (or at least reinterpret) the Bayh-Dole Act.50
2. In re Norvir 1 (2004)
Seven years later, the NIH was required to address a second
march-in petition-this time triggered by citizen-activists rather than
a drug company seeking early market entry. In the first Norvir
march-in petition,51 an activist group named Essential Inventions
[http://perma.cc/V3QY-HZQD] [hereinafter CellPro NIH]; see also John Hopkins Univ. v.
CellPro, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 303 (D. Del. 1996).
47. Compare Kevin W. McCabe, Implications of the CellPro Determination on Inventions
Made With Federal Assistance: Will the Government Ever Exercise Its March-In Rights?, 27 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 645, 649 (1998) (defending the refusal to exercise march-in rights) with Mary Eberle,
March-In Rights Under the Bayh-Dole Act: Public Access to Federally Funded Research, 3 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 155, 171 (1999) (arguing, contra McCabe, "that a march-in under one of
the four circumstances enumerated in the Act would not harm technology transfer"); see also
Tamsen Valoir, Government Funded Inventions: The Bayh-Dole Act and the Hopkins v. CellPro
March-in Rights Controversy, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 211 (2000).
48. CellPro, 931 F.Supp. at 306.
49. CellPro NIH, supra note 46.
50. See, e.g., Eberle, supra note 47, at 171; Valoir, supra note 47.
51. In the Case of Norvir® Manufactured by Abbott Laboratories, Inc (Norvir I) (Nat'l
Inst. of Health, 2004) (determination), http://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/policy/March-In-Norvir.pdf [http://perma.cc/ST6Z-8C5L]. Winston & Strawn
represents Abbott Laboratories, including in connection with Norvir, but I have no role in the
Abbott relationship and am speaking here solely in my personal capacity.
2016] 255
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complained to the NIH that patentee Abbott Laboratories had
unreasonably raised the price of the antiretroviral Norvir, a drug of
only modest efficacy on its own but synergistic in combination with
certain other drugs. In this instance, unlike In re CellPro, there was
no dispute that Abbott had successfully commercialized its subject
invention; rather, the petitioners urged the NIH to march in because
the high price of Norvir allegedly put the health and safety of the
public at risk. The NIH refused to exercise its march-in rights,
reasoning that the Bayh-Dole Act does not reach pricing decisions so
long as the patentee has taken reasonable steps to achieve practical
commercialization:
Norvir& has been available for use by patients with HIV/AIDS since 1996 and is being
actively marketed by Abbott and prescribed by physicians primarily as a booster drug.
Accordingly, this drug has reached practical application and met health or safety needs
as required by the Bayh-Dole Act. The NIH believes that the issue of drug pricing is one
that would be more appropriately addressed by Congress, as it considers these matters
in a larger context. The NIH also maintains that the FTC is the appropriate agency to
address the question of whether Abbott has engaged in anti-competitive behavior.
5 2
Norvir I reached the same result as CelIPro (a refusal to march
in) for similar reasons (Abbott is making reasonable efforts to
commercialize its patented invention), but it adds an activist's
dimension to the debate; for the first time, private pressure groups
tried to use the Bayh-Dole Act in an effort to influence corporate
decisions (specifically, pricing).
3. In re Xalatan (2004)
In a companion case to In re Norvir I, Essential Inventions
challenged the price in the United States of Pfizer's anti-glaucoma
medicine Xalatan as unreasonably high compared with its price in
other countries.53 Xalatan followed the same pattern as Norvir I: NIH
concluded that Pfizer had effectively commercialized the subject
invention "because it [was] being utilized and [had] been made widely
available for use by glaucoma patients for at least eight years.'54 The
NIH declined to second-guess Pfizer's pricing decisions:
[Tihe NIH believes that the extraordinary remedy of march-in is not an appropriate
means of controlling prices. The issue of whether drugs should be sold in the United
States for the same price as they are sold in Canada and Europe has global implications
and, thus, is appropriately left for Congress to address legislatively.
5 5
52. Id.
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Xalatan and Norvir I reached the same result for the same
reason: it is for Congress, not the NIH, to decide whether high prices
are a sufficient reason to exercise march-in rights (and hence
undermine patent rights in government-funded inventions).
56
4. In re Fabrazyme (2010)
Unlike the CellPro, Xalatan, and Norvir petitions, the
Fabrazyme petition involved an actual, acute shortage of a patented
drug.5 7 Fabrazyme is the brand name of a subject invention developed
by the Mount Sinai School of Medicine to treat Fabry's disease, a
genetic disorder. Mount Sinai licensed the patent to Genzyme, which
obtained FDA approval and marketed Fabrazyme for several years.
After FDA approval, however, Genzyme experienced significant
manufacturing problems that resulted in at least one contaminated
batch of Fabrazyme. In response, FDA fined Genzyme $175 million,
temporarily suspended Genzyme's manufacturing rights, and imposed
additional oversight. This led to a significant short-term drop in the
supply of Fabrazyme and prompted physician C. Allen Black, Jr. to
petition the NIH to march in.58 However, because no third parties
were close to being able to manufacture FDA-approved Fabrazyme
and Genzyme expected to resume full manufacturing shortly, the NIH
declined to exercise its march-in rights, reasoning that the fact that
Genzyme suffered unrelated regulatory problems after achieving
practical commercialization was an insufficient basis to march in.
59
5. In re Norvir II (2012)
In 2012, a coalition of activist groups (Knowledge Ecology
International, the American Medical Students Association, the US
Public Interest Research Group, and Universities Allied for Essential
Medicines) asked the NIH to reconsider In re Norvir I based on
continued pricing disparities between countries and in connection with
56. See generally John H. Rabitschek & Norman J. Latker, Reasonable Pricing-A New
Twist for March-in Rights Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 149, 160 (2005).
57. In the Case of FabrazymeO Manufactured by Genzyme Corporation (Nat'l Inst. of
Health, 2010) (determination), http://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/policy[March-In-Fabrazyme.pdf [http://perma.cc/EGJ4-SC63] [hereinafter
Fabrazyme].
58. See generally William O'Brien, March-in Rights Under the Bayh-Dole Act: The NIH's
Paper Tiger?, 43 SETON HALLL. REV. 1403, 1419-23 (2013).
59. Fabrazyme, supra note 57.
20161
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different health insurance regimes.60 However, "[t]he NIH continue[d]
to agree with the public testimony in 2004 that the extraordinary
remedy of march-in is not an appropriate means of controlling prices
of drugs broadly available to physicians and patients."
61
6. Other March-In Petitions
In addition to these five full-blown petitions, there have been
several other march-in efforts that fizzled short of decision.62 There
were discussions concerning march-in for anti-anthrax vaccines
during the height of the anthrax crisis post-9/11,63 and there have
been occasional petitions to the Department of Energy64 and the
Department of Defense65 in which march-in-type rights were raised.
66
Most recently, Senator Patrick Leahy sent a July 2013 letter to NIH
urging it to force Myriad Genetics to license its patents relating to
breast cancer testing methods.67 At least since the Bayh-Dole Act was
enacted, none of these petitions has ever reached the point of decision.
60. In the Case of Norvir® Manufactured by AbbVie (Nat'l Inst. of Health, 2013)
(determination), http://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policylMarch-In-
Norvir20l3.pdf [http://perma.ccN8E3-D8RG].
61. Id. at 7. Winston & Strawn represents AbbVie, including in connection with Norvir,
but I have no role in the Abbott relationship and am speaking here solely in my personal
capacity.
62. See generally U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-742, INFORMATION ON
THE GOVERNMENT'S RIGHT TO ASSERT OWNERSHIP CONTROL OVER FEDERALLY FUNDED
INVENTIONS, at 9-14 (2009).
63. See, e.g., Raymond A. Kurz & Celine Jimenez Crowson, Patents 'R' Us?, 24 L. TIMES
44 (Nov. 5, 2001).
64. E.g., Diane M. Sidebottom, Intellectual Property in Federal Government Contracts:
The Past, The Present, and One Possible Future, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 63, 95 n.245 (2003)
(identifying two possible march-in events by DOE's predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission,
in 1974).
65. E.g., Patent Policy: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Sci., Tech., and Space of the
Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and Transp., 96th Cong., 366 (2004) (statement of Dale W. Church,
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Policy) ("Only once can I recall there was a
case where we exercised march-in rights. It was a case involving two patents held by MIT. There
was a complainant who felt as though the patents were not being utilized. As to one of the
patents, it was found that MIT was using it and was allowed to retain exclusive title. In the case
of the other, we found that MIT was not effectively using it, and they did provide for the
complainant to use the patent."); see also Campbell Plastics Eng'g & Mfg. Co. v. Brownlee, 389
F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining that the DOD took title to the subject invention for failure
to follow Bayh-Dole Act invention disclosure rules).
66. Rabitschek & Latker, supra note 1, at 154-55.
67. Letter from Sen. Patrick Leahy, to Dr. Francis S. Collins, Dir., Nat'l Inst. of Health,
http://patentdocs.typepad.com/files/leahy-letter.pdf [http://perma.cc/VN27-XPH4]. A decision on
Sen. Leahy's letter likely was forestalled by the Supreme Court's decision to invalidate at least
some of the patents on the involved subject inventions. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
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IN. ALTERNATIVES TO MARCH-IN RIGHTS
Academics and activist groups point to the five NIH decisions
and other failed efforts to exercise march-in rights as proof that the
current structure is fundamentally flawed. According to some,
march-in is a "paper tiger," ineffective in achieving Bayh-Dole's public
policy goals.68  Indeed, the academic literature surrounding the
Bayh-Dole Act's march-in clause almost uniformly calls for enhanced
government march-in rights.
69
Even without changes to the Bayh-Dole Act, the US
government has two ways to enable a third party to practice a
government-funded, privately-held patent. First, the government
could use its own government-purpose license under 35 U.S.C.
§ 202(c)(4). Second, the government could use its
authorization-and-consent authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 in order
to immunize a third party from infringement liability. In both
instances, however, the scope of the resulting license or authorization
(as it relates to commercial uses) is unclear.70 At a further extreme,
some commentators advocate for an express compulsory license
regime.71  Compulsory license regimes exist in other forms of
intellectual property-for example, music performance and
reproduction copyrights are subject to a complicated web of
compulsory licenses.72 But in the context of high-technology patents, a
compulsory license could dramatically reduce the value of the
government-sponsored patents and consequently the incentive to
invest in commercialization.73  Indeed, a compulsory-license regime
would yield almost the same situation that existed prior to the
enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act.
Other commentators-like the petitioners in the Xalatan and
Norvir II petitions-suggest a form of price control, in which drug
prices deemed "too high" (generally in comparison to prices in other
68. O'Brien, supra note 58, at 1405, 1429.
69. E.g., id. at 1429-30; Eberle, supra note 47, at 179; Barbara M. McGarey & Annette
C. Levey, Patents, Products, and Public Health: An Analysis of the CellPro March-In Petition, 14
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1095 (1999); Rives, supra note 1, at 77; Valoir, supra note 47, at 239.
70. McGarey & Levey, supra note 69, at 1113-15.
71. Kimberly M. Thomas, Comment, Protecting Academic and Non-Profit Research:
Creating a Compulsory Licensing Provision in the Absence of an Experimental Use Exception, 23
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 347, 349 (2006) (footnote omitted) ("[Tihis comment
suggests reformation of the Bayh-Dole Act, a federal technology transfer policy, as the conduit to
enact a compulsory licensing provision.").
72. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012).
73. Jerome H. Reichman, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions:
Evaluating the Options, 37(2) J.L. MED. & ETHICS 247 (2010) (discussing the literature).
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jurisdictions) would be per se justification for march-in.74 But the
government is a poor judge of how private companies should price
their products and hence has wisely refrained from using march-in
rights to dictate how much companies should charge for patented
goods and services.
75
Both the relative paucity of march-in cases and the fact that all
of the march-in petitions for granting third-party licenses that have
gone to decision have been refused suggest that the march-in
provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act set roughly the correct balance. If
government-funded patents were being serially suppressed, it is
reasonable to expect that more march-in petitions would be filed. Also
notable is the fact that only one march-in petition (CellPro) involved a
petition by a company that actually wanted-and could use-a
compulsory license. In the other four march-in petitions to the NIH,
the petitioner wanted the US government to march in but was not in a
position to actually make the product covered by the government-
funded patent. Perhaps the paucity of further activist petitions
reflects private-actor expectations that their efforts will be in vain.
But the paucity of further pharmaceutical company petitions
(compared to, say, citizen petitions to the FDA or challenges to the
Hatch-Waxman Act) and the absence of any petitions from
non-pharmaceutical businesses suggest a relatively high level of
comfort with the existing Bayh-Dole Act architecture. This is not
altogether surprising. After all, the Bayh-Dole Act is viewed as an
unrivaled success in encouraging and effectuating technology transfer,
so it is hard to see why march-in should be made easier.
76
Indeed, if there is a problem with the march-in right, it may be
that its chilling effects are too extreme. Despite the fact that they
have never been exercised and have only even been requested in the
pharmaceutical context, march-in rights remain a very significant
concern for private companies-particularly the kind of high-tech
companies that the Bayh-Dole Act was intended to bring in to the
74. Peter Arno & Michael Davis, Why Don't We Enforce Existing Drug Price Controls?
The Unrecognized and Unenforced Reasonable Pricing Requirements Imposed upon Patents
Deriving in Whole or in Part from Federally Funded Research, 75 TUL. L. REV. 631 (2001); see
also Rives, supra note 1, at 119 ("NIH can, and should, start marching-in now."); O'Brien, supra
note 58, at 1431 ("[T]he Fabrazyme case demonstrates [the NIH's] failure in effectuating another
primary goal: protecting the public health and safety from the nonuse or unreasonable use of
inventions funded by taxpayer dollars.").
75. See Raubitschek & Latker, supra note 1, at 150, 165-67 ('The Act has been
enormously effective.").
76. See Jean 0. Lanjouw, Intellectual Property and the Availability of Pharmaceuticals
in Poor Countries, in 3 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 91, 103 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh
Lerner, & Scott Stern eds., 2003) ("The Bayh-Dole Act and related legislation appear to have had
their desired effect.").
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government contracting ecosystem. It is difficult to quantify the
deterrent effects of 35 U.S.C. § 203 or 28 U.S.C. § 1498. But
anecdotally-and this is wholly consistent with the author's own
experience-the reluctance of such companies to do business with the
government is almost invariably tied up in concerns over the
government's right to appropriate private sector intellectual
property.7 7 This result runs directly counter to the US government's
desire for maximum competition78 and is contrary to the stated goal of
the Bayh-Dole Act.
79
In part, this concern springs from misconception concerning
the nature of patent rights in general. As it stands, the government
has the absolute right to practice any US patent. This is not a
function of the Bayh-Dole Act at all, but rather it is an attribute of US
sovereignty as reflected in 28 U.S.C. § 1498.80 But even with that
attribute understood, coupled with the fact that in more than
thirty-five years the government has never exercised its march-in
rights, the anxiety remains. The anxiety is not altogether ill-founded.
Since 1997, the NIH has averaged more than one march-in petition
every five years-and each march-in petition potentially puts at risk
the staggeringly massive investment that branded pharmaceutical
companies make in developing new drug therapies8 1-$2.6 billion per
new drug in 2014, according to the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug
Development.
82
Instead of looking for ways to strengthen march-in rights,
perhaps the better solution would be to look at ways to eliminate the
march-in provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act and Executive Order 12591,
while still ensuring that the government's policy in favor of effective
77. See generally Nancy 0. Dix, Fernand A. Lavallee, & Kimberly C. Welch, Fear and
Loathing of Federal Contracting: Are Commercial Companies Really Afraid to Do Business with
the Federal Government? Should They Be?, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 5 (2003).
78. E.g., GUIDELINES FOR CREATING AND MAINTAINING A COMPETITIVE ENV'T FOR
SUPPLIES AND SERVS. IN THE DEP'T OF DEF. (OFFICE OF THE UNDERSEC'Y OF DEF. FOR
ACQUISITION, TECH., AND LOGISTICS, 2014).
79. See 35 U.S.C. § 2000 (2012).
80. "Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United States is
used or manufactured by or for the United States without license of the owner thereof or lawful
right to use or manufacture the same, the owner's remedy shall be by action against the United
States in the United States Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire
compensation for such use and manufacture." 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2012).
81. See, e.g., Joseph Allen, High Noon for Bayh-Dole, IP WATCHDOG (Jul. 17, 2013),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/07/17Jhigh-noon-for-bayb-dole/id=43371/ [http://perma.cc/
BL6F-WKMW] ("Mhis march-in could only happen after companies have invested years of
effort and hundreds of millions-or billions-of dollars to develop a new product.").
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commercialization is met. There are at least three logical options for
avoiding or replacing march-in rights: alternative contractual vehicles,
economic penalties, or litigation remedies.
A. Alternative Contractual Vehicles
The Bayh-Dole Act only applies to funding agreements. The
government has a wide variety of other contractual vehicles at its
disposal. For example, Other Transactions Authority allows
businesses to contract around the restrictions imposed by the
Bayh-Dole Act.8 3 Other Transactions (OTs) are available by statute to
NASA and the Department of Energy84 and have been used by other
agencies based on regulatory enactments.8 5 The use of alternative
contract types does not require any new legislation-these vehicles
already exist, and based on recent Supreme Court precedents, there is
good reason to think that parties are allowed to contract around the
Bayh-Dole Act, even with respect to funding agreements.8 6 But while
OTs and other new contract types may be an effective solution, the
widespread adoption of OTs as an alternative to funding vehicles
would require a broad-based change in government contracting
practice that seems unlikely-especially in response to continued
concerns about march-in rights.
B. Economic Penalties
At present, the government's only remedy for a contractor's
failure to effectively commercialize a subject invention is the exercise
of march-in rights-a nuclear option. It might be possible instead to
impose a number of different systems of fines or payments. For
example, the government might impose fines on companies that fail to
follow agreed upon commercialization plans or achieve specific
contractual milestones. Such a system would be akin in structure to a
contractual penalty clause. Another option would be a maintenance
fee specific to subject inventions. Patents already require
maintenance fees that increase over time.87 The law could be changed
83. See, e.g., David S. Bloch & James G. McEwen, "Other Transactions" With Uncle
Sam: A Solution to the High-Tech Government Contracting Crisis, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 195
(2002).
84. See 10 U.S.C. § 2371 (2014); 51 U.S.C. § 20113(e) (2010).
85. See, e.g., MCEWEN, supra note 11, at § 3.11; see also L. ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL34760, OTHER TRANSACTIONS (OT) AUTHORITY 5-6 (2011).
86. See Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc.,
563 U.S. 776 (2011).
87. 35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (2013); Post Issuance Fees, 37 C.F.R. § 1.20 (2013).
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to impose additional fees on some or all subject invention patents in
order to create additional incentives to monetize them. Contracts
subject to the Bayh-Dole Act could also include buyout clauses: if a
government contractor wants to avoid the risk of march-in, it can
repay some or all of the government's expenditures 'relating to the
subject invention. By reimbursing the public for the cost of invention,
the contractor would eliminate the concern that the public good is not
being served or that innovations paid for with public money are being
used for private benefit. Considering the value of pharmaceutical
patents, it is conceivable that a Pfizer or a Genzyme would have been
inclined to buy out the risk of a march-in challenge to a blockbuster
drug, while less-promising patented drugs presumably would remain
subject to the march-in risk (and hence spur additional research or,
alternatively, voluntary relinquishment of the patent). Such economic
remedies would require only minor tweaks to the existing structure of
the Bayh-Dole Act. Recoupment was considered and rejected in the
months leading up to the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act.s8 It has
been consistently rejected since.8 9 But in light of current realities, it
might be worth revisiting those debates.
C. Litigation Remedies
Another alternative to traditional march-in would be to shift
the process from agencies (which are loath to involve themselves in
fact-finding) to the court system. At present, defendants cannot assert
a Bayh-Dole Act defense.90 They cannot rely on the government's
right to assert ownership because whether the government chooses to
exercise that right is purely discretionary.9 1
It would not be difficult, however, to reframe the law to allow a
Bayh-Dole Act defense. In a case involving a Bayh-Dole Act
affirmative defense, the courts (as opposed to a government agency)
would determine when the patentee has complied with the Act. This
is the kind of analysis courts undertake routinely. Courts are
inherently better suited to make factual determinations and develop
rules of general applicability, because that is the heart of the
88. See John H. Raubitschek & Norman J. Latker, Reasonable Pricing-A New Twist
for March-In Rights Under The Bayh-Dole Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
149, 163 (2005).
89. See Rebecca S. Eiseinberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1716 (1996).
90. See Platzer v. Sloan-Kettering Inst. for Cancer Res., 787 F.Supp. 360, 364 (S.D.N.Y.
1992).
91. See Central Admixture Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiac Solutions, P.C.,
482 F.3d 1347, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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common-law adversarial decision-making process; courts exist to
resolve contested issues. By contrast, the NIH has repeatedly-in
each of its five march-in decisions-disclaimed any competency to
make such contested factual determinations. Making the Bayh-Dole
Act an explicit part of the litigation process also would ensure
march-in-type remedies are only in play with respect to patents with
significant economic value.
There are a number of ways a litigation-based remedy could be
structured. For one, the courts could simply conclude that the failure
to comply fully with the Bayh-Dole Act is a form of patent misuse.
Similarly, the False Claims Act prohibits the submission of a material
"false record or statement" to the government.92  In theory, an
inaccurate commercialization report submitted to the government
could be viewed as a species of false claim. Under 35 U.S.C. § 211,
"[nlothing in [the Bayh-Dole Act] shall be deemed to convey to any
person immunity from civil or criminal liability, or to create any
defenses to actions, under any antitrust law," so there is no legal
barrier to letting courts consider a patentee's compliance with the
Bayh-Dole Act as a defense.
93
Another alternative would be to change pleading requirements
for subject inventions. The Federal Judicial Council could promulgate
a rule that any patentee asserting a subject invention in litigation
would need to affirmatively state that it has complied with the
Bayh-Dole Act and applicable regulations. If that affirmative
allegation were later proved false, the defendant could seek sanctions
against the patentee under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.94
The idea of a private right of action for Bayh-Dole Act
violations was considered and rejected when the law was enacted.
95
Again, though, that decision need not stand for all time. These
litigation remedies could largely be enacted by administrative
regulations, though it is possible that certain minor amendments to
Title 35 also would be required.
92. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (1982).
93. 35 U.S.C. § 211 (2012).
94. "By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper-whether by
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it-an attorney or unrepresented party certifies
that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances . . . (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing
existing law or for establishing new law; [and] (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary
support ... " FED. R. Civ. P 11(b).
95. See John H. Raubitschek & Norman J. Latker, Reasonable Pricing-A New Twist
for March-In Rights Under The Bayh-Dole Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
149, 156 (2005), quoting S. Rep. No. 96-480 at 33-34 (1979).
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D. Assessment of Alternatives
Of these options, the author tends to favor a form of litigation
remedy. There is no reason that a patentee holding a US
government-funded patent should not need to affirmatively plead
compliance with applicable laws and regulations. However, the
author remains skeptical that widespread adoption of alternative
contractual vehicles will occur, though they could solve several other
issues in government contracting.96 And the author is affirmatively
opposed to economic penalties or compulsory licenses, which would do
far more harm than good because each option would, in its own way,
significantly reduce the incentive of technology companies to invest in
commercializing government-financed technology.
V. CONCLUSION: INCREMENTAL CHANGES ARE BEST
By any measure, the Bayh-Dole Act has been a smashing
success. And as discussed above, the Act's march-in provision is an
important part of the overall statutory architecture. But it also has
the unintended effect of suppressing some amount of private-sector
participation in US government contracting efforts. Because that is
so, it is reasonable to consider modest, calibrated changes to the
march-in right. But those changes should not make it easier for the
government to exercise those rights-encouraging march-in petitions
would further reduce private-sector incentives to seek out government
funding. At best, of the options above, the author would support
strengthening the Bayh-Dole Act's other provisions, perhaps by
creating an affirmative defense of failure to comply with the law and
applicable regulations.
Of course, one size need not fit all. Perhaps the mandatory
rules set forth in the Bayh-Dole Act, complete with march-in rights,
could continue to apply to small businesses, nonprofits, and
universities, while agencies could relax the rules for large
contractors-the way the Department of Defense has exercised the
right to specially negotiate intellectual property license rights.9 7 On
balance, the Bayh-Dole Act's success is probably reason enough to
avoid any radical changes. But to the extent that industry remains
afraid or unwilling to do business with the government, some of the
more industry-friendly modifications discussed herein should be
considered.
96. See Bloch & McEwen, supra note 83.
97. See 48 C.F.R. 252.227-7013(b)(4) (2014); 48 C.F.R. 252.227-7014(b)(4) (2015).
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